1+1+1=1: Making Sense of Nonsense: The Concept of the Trinity at the End of the 20th Century by Herrick, Jennifer Anne
269
1+1+1=1: Making Sense of Nonsense: The Concept
of the Trinity at the End of the 20th Century
Jennifer Anne Herrick
Introduction
Bernard Lonergan has commented wryly of trinitarian theology that
‘The Trinity is a matter of five notions or properties, four relations,
three persons, two processions, one substance or nature, and no
understanding’.1 This quip is aimed at Thomas Aquinas, who in Part
One of the Summa Theologica spoke of the One God in terms of two
processions, three persons, four relations and five notions. Douglas
Ottati has similarly commented: ‘More than a few people regard
trinitarian doctrine as the quintessential statement of Christian
nonsense: 1+1+1=1’.2 Elizabeth Johnson agrees, arguing that in the
West the triune symbol has been neglected, literalised and treated as a
curiosity. She observes that the doctrine has become unintelligible
and religiously irrelevant on a wide scale.3
At the end of the twentieth century, the problem for trinitarianism
was to overcome this general perception of unintelligibility and
irrelevance. The problem has concerned philosophers of religion and
theologians alike. The late Catherine Mowry LaCugna has noted that
philosophers have long pursued the question of the intelligibility and
coherence of the Trinity and that theologians stand to learn from the
philosophical exploration. At the same time, philosophers might
profit from hearing a theological perspective.4 Over the past decade
or so, many academic theologians have come to find the traditional
language used of the Christian trinitarian God to be problematic. This
                                                           
1 Gerald O’Collins, ‘The Holy Trinity: The State of the Questions’ in Stephen T
Davis, Daniel Kendall and Gerald O’Collins (eds) The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary
Symposium on the Trinity (Oxford, 1999) 2.
2 Douglas Ottati, ‘Being Trinitarian: The Shape of Saving Faith’, The Christian
Century 112:32, 1995, 1044.
3 Elizabeth Johnson, ‘Let the Symbol Sing Again’, Theology Today 54:3, 1997, 299.
4 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, ‘Philosophers and Theologians on the Trinity’, Modern
Theology 2:3, 1986, 169.
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paper highlights the issues that have arisen around this concept and
the efforts that have been made in recent postmodern thought to
present it in more intelligible terms.
In late twentieth century thought, the problem of the intelligibility of
trinitarianism has been raised particularly within the contemporary
theological arena of postmodern Western Christianity, particularly in
the Euro-American and Australian scene. But it is also a problem that
relates to the spread of the Latin Western tradition of Christianity.
This spread remains an aspect of the globalisation and westernisation
of the world, which involves forms of cultural, religious and
linguistic colonisation. Alister McGrath has pointed out that the
spread of the Latin Western tradition of Christianity is a religious
colonisation enabled by the fact that systematic theology has
generally been developed in a Western context. This religious
colonisation is reinforced by a linguistic one, English being the
preferred language of the global Christian community, just as in the
world of business and scholarship.5 Of the link between religion and
language, McGrath comments that it is ‘of no small importance that
the two leading English-speaking nations have shown a strong
commitment to Christian mission and education’.6
Miroslav Volf observes a significant aspect of this process: ‘while
established and “mainstream” denominations appear to be puzzled
and foundering, the “free churches” on many continents are
flourishing’.7 These difficulties on the part of established Western
traditions have stemmed in part from a loss of intelligibility of the
traditional language used to express that which is central to
Christianity: that God is triune. The free churches are yet to show a
concern for such problems. This loss of intelligibility has to do with
the categories of thought used to conceptualise the Trinity, which
include the legacy of Greek metaphysical, German idealist and
modern individualist philosophies. These are no longer considered
                                                           
5 Alister E McGrath, The Future of Christianity (Oxford, 2002) 27.
6 Ibid, 91.
7 John W Stewart, ‘The Shape of the Church: Congregational and Trinitarian’,
Christian Century 115:16, 1998, 541. See Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The
Church in the Image of the Trinity, ed Alan G Padgett (Grand Rapids, 1998) 11ff.
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adequate to the task – in particular, the concept of person, understood
in terms of substance, subject or individual, respectively. Postmodern
philosophers have highlighted the dangers of both tritheistic or
modalistic interpretation in trinitarian thought, which not only
endanger the intelligibility of the concept, but endanger that which
distinguishes Christianity theologically. In response, postmodernist
theologians have begun to develop more personalist and relationist
philosophical schema for its understanding.
The Importance of the Problem of Intelligibility
A significant number of Christian authors, writing in the last twenty
years or so, have suggested that the language of Christian trinitarian
doctrine is unintelligible in the contemporary world. Walter Kasper
acknowledges that this situation ‘poses a powerful challenge to
theologians’.8 But one might note, with Edward Oakes, a shift in the
role of the theologian in this debate. In the early church most
theologians were bishops, in the Middle Ages, monks, and in modern
times, professors. This shift reflects a correlated shift from conciliar
statement to prayer to specialisation and technicality. The effect of
this is that today, theology ‘becomes accessible to non-
professionals’.9
The importance of this, as Johnson notes, is that the Trinity
‘continues to be found in the appendix of the personal catechism of
many minds and hearts’.10 Over the last decades, the aim of much
trinitarian writing has been to shift this concept from the appendix to
the central body of Christian teaching and belief. This strategy is a
function of a perceived need to contextualise Christianity in a
religiously pluralistic, postmodern age. Jürgen Moltmann is
representative of the view that ‘dialogue with other religions is not
                                                           
8 Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans Matthew J O’Connell (London,
1984) 263.
9 Edward Oakes, Review of Francis Schüssler Fiorenza and John P Gavin (eds)
Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives and Catherine Mowry LaCugna,
God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life, America 167:12, 1992, 306.
10 Elizabeth Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological
Discourse (New York, 1993) 192.
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helped if Christians relativize that which is distinctively Christian’.11
Joseph Bracken has spoken of the continued value of the doctrine of
the Trinity ‘in an age of increasing scepticism about the possibility of
objective truth not only in theology but in any other area of public
life’.12 Indeed Bracken has highlighted that ‘the doctrine of the
Trinity, with its dual emphasis on oneness and threeness as equally
ultimate, contains unexpected and hitherto unexplored resources for
dealing with the problems, and possibilities, of contemporary
pluralism’.13 In a pluralist Western society, if the Christian faith is to
assert that it is unique and relevant, both anthropologically and
soteriologically, it must do so in clear, intelligible, language.
It is arguable, then, that Christians need first to attend to their own
intra-religious dialogue before engaging meaningfully in inter-
religious dialogue. Thomas Marsh emphasises that ‘it cannot be a
matter of indifference, then, how this understanding is in practice
perceived and presented’.14 Theological inconsistencies and
unintelligibilities need to be addressed so that Western Christians can
better understand the central tenets of their religion and meaningful
dialogue can occur with other religions. The importance of this is that
the question of how God is viewed is related to that of how humanity
views itself. It is a two-way street, as Johnson remarks: the way a
community shapes its language about God implicitly represents what
it takes to be the highest good, the profoundest truth. This language in
turn shapes the identity and praxis of the community.15
The doctrine of the Trinity has both reflected and dictated how
Christians view not merely God but also themselves and others.
                                                           
11 Jürgen Moltmann, History and the Triune God: Contributions to Trinitarian
Theology, trans John Bowden (London, 1991) xi. Moltmann refers here to J Hick and
P Knitter (eds) The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of
Religions (Maryknoll, 1987).
12 Joseph Bracken, Review of Kevin J Vanhoozer (ed) The Trinity in a Pluralistic
Age: Theological Essays on Culture and Religion, Theology Today 54:3, 1997, 400.
13 Ibid.
14 Thomas Marsh, The Triune God: A Biblical, Historical and Theological Study
(Mystic, 1994) 163.
15 Johnson, She Who Is, 3-4.
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LaCugna emphasises that ‘the central theme of all trinitarian theology
is relationship’.16 To the extent that Christians have taken seriously
the ‘three in one’, their view of society, both secular and religious,
has been communitarian. By contrast, to the extent that Christians
have rested with pre-trinitarian or non-trinitarian monotheism, then
hierarchical and patriarchal views of society and church have ensued.
The question of the Trinity affects not only their view of themselves
but their view of, and dialogue with, others. Trinitarian thought has
far-reaching practical import. This explains Johnson’s enthusiasm for
the concept: ‘For too long, this symbol has been imprisoned in
misunderstandings. It is time to set it free to sing again’.17
Contextualising the Problem of Trinitarianism
The loss of intelligibility of trinitarian thought in the West has
occurred against the background of the divorce of the Christian East
and West. There are a series of theological divisions that have
particularly influenced thought on the Trinity in the West.
i.  The separation of East and West
In speaking of the Trinity, the badge of orthodoxy in the East is: one
‘ousia’, three ‘hypostases’.18 In the Latin West the badge became:
one essence or substance, ‘substantia’, in three persons, ‘personae’.
John Thompson points out that, while the form of the theologies of
East and West were one, the East had at its disposal a subtler, more
dynamic and more nuanced language in Greek. In its discussion of
the Trinity, the language of the West was more static, less flexible.
Added to this were different starting points: the East started with the
persons and the West, with the unity. The result was variations in use
of the terminology adopted to speak of the Trinity.19 The thought of
                                                           
16 LaCugna, ‘Practical Trinity’, The Christian Century 109:22, 1992, 679.
17 Johnson, ‘To Let the Symbol’, 305.
18 J N D Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (London, 1977) 254.
19 Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives (New York and Oxford, 1994) 125-
26.
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the Cappadocians came to express a trinitarian understanding and
emphasis different from that of Augustine.
ii.  The separation of confession and doctrine
Christopher Hall recounts that, as the Church developed, it ‘produced
a language and grammar that moves beyond the Bible’s specific
boundaries as Christians sought to worship and understand the
complex God the gospel revealed’.20 The consequences of this for
trinitarian doctrine is that it came to be grounded not so much in
experience but in philosophy: Greek philosophy. David Cunningham
contends that the state of trinitarian thought is a direct consequence of
this shift away from the biblical narratives.21 Susan Thistlethwaite is
similarly mindful that what is now taken to be orthodox trinitarian
language and theology results from an original contact with the
Greco-Roman world and its basic presuppositions.22 Trinitarian
concepts and language became increasingly technical and involved as
theology attempted to come to terms with these presuppositions. For
many, as a result, this doctrine became unintelligible and so irrelevant
to their Christian lives.
Although it is widely assumed that Christians ought to learn that God
is Trinity, at some point in the West this doctrine lost its centrality.
By the late eighteenth century, accounts of the Christian faith were
written with little reference to trinitarian doctrine.23 Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804) wrote in Conflict of the Faculties: ‘The doctrine of the
Trinity, taken literally, has no practical relevance at all, even if we
think we understand it ... Whether we are to worship three or ten
                                                           
20 Christopher Hall, ‘Adding up the Trinity’, Review of Roderick T Leupp, Knowing
the Name of God; Thomas Marsh, The Triune God; John Thompson, Modern
Trinitarian Perspectives and Peter Toon et al, Our Triune God, Christianity Today
41:5, 1997, 27.
21 David S Cunningham, These Three Are One: The Practice of Trinitarian Theology
(Malden, 1998) 22.
22 Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, ‘On the Trinity’, Interpretation 45:2, 1991, 163.
23 Cunningham, op cit, i-ix.
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persons in the Deity makes no difference’.24 Shortly thereafter, F D E
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) wrote in The Christian Faith: ‘Our faith
in Christ ... would be the same even if we had no knowledge of any
such transcendent fact (the Trinity) and even if the fact itself were
different’.25 Yet, throughout Christian history, practices continue to
be trinitarian. With the split in the West between functional
confession and philosophical doctrine comes a loss of intelligibility
of trinitarian doctrine. This is compounded by two further conceptual
seperations: the seperation of God’s unity and God’s trinity, and the
seperation of the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity.
iii.  The seperation of concepts of God as One and God as Three
Western theological tradition has split the trinitarian doctrine of God
into two parts, as has been commented on by many recent Western
theologians. To explain why most Western theological accounts of
the Trinity start from a notion of the one God, only to arrive at the
notion of the triune God, Leonardo Boff gives an account in terms of
Christianity’s Judaic and Greek monotheistic inheritance. The
Christian inheritance of the Greek notion of the One Supreme Being,
coupled with the Judaic affirmation of Yahweh as the one and only
true and living God, has given Christianity a pre-trinitarian and a-
trinitarian monotheism that has been hard to shake.26 The pinnacle of
the long historical development of this notion, according to Wolfhart
Pannenberg, lies in Aquinas, who ‘gave the structure of the doctrine
of God its classical form ... Basic to this structure is the derivation of
the trinity of persons from the concept of the unity of substance’.27
The basic problem with separating De Deo Uno from De Deo Trino is
that it has given rise to a widespread assumption that the former is
                                                           
24 Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, trans A W Wood and G di
Giovanni, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge,
1996) 264.
25 F D E Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans H R Mackintosh and J S Stewart
(Edinburgh, 1928) 741.
26 Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society, trans Paul Burns (London, 1988) 16-18.
27 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, trans G W Bromiley (Grand Rapids,
1991) 1:288. See pages 288-291 for elaboration.
On a Panegyrical Note
276
prior and fundamental, the latter but a later accretion at a lower level
of symbolisation. Christoph Schwöbel has pointed to Eastern
Orthodoxy’s criticism of this aspect of Western theology: its
marginalisation of the Trinity.28 Outlining the consequences of this
marginalisation, John Henry Newman warns of abandoning belief in
God as three in favour of the oneness of God in the manner of the
Unitarians; this approach will be met by a counter-revival of the
Manichean dualism: God as two. Such a response in found in the
early twentieth century in Rudolf Steiner’s Anthroposophical
Movement, which is merely a step away from outright atheism: God
as none. Oakes refers to this as the ‘Newmanian declension from
Three to One to Two to None’.29
Recent Western critiques of the unitarian approach have examined
the assumption that De Deo Uno is prior and fundamental. Moltmann
diagnoses the problem as one of ‘substance’: the primacy of
substance in thinking of personhood has had considerable
consequences for Western theology and for Western thinking in
general. For Moltmann, it has led to the disintegration of the doctrine
of the Trinity into abstract monotheism.30 Catherine LaCugna
contends likewise that ‘after Kant, Feuerbach, and the philosophical
revolution of the Enlightenment, the idea of an “in itself” is to be
viewed as a philosophical impossibility, and this especially if God is
the subject’.31 Out of critiques of this tradition in the West has come
the challenge: to express intelligibly, as Pannenberg has asserted, that
not only is the trinity compatible with the unity, but also that ‘the
thought of the unity is not relevant or consistent apart from the
trinity’.32
                                                           
28 Christoph Schwöbel, ‘The Renaissance of Trinitarian Theology: Reasons,
Problems and Tasks’ in Christoph Schwöbel (ed) Trinitarian Theology Today:
Essays on Divine Being and Act (Edinburgh and London, 1995) 5.
29 Edward T Oakes, Review of David Cunningham, These Three Are One: The
Practice of Trinitarian Theology, Theological Studies 59:3, 1998, 529.
30 Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God,
trans Margaret Kohl (London, 1981) 17.
31 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (New
York, 1993) 168.
32 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 1:291.  
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iv.  The separation of concepts of economic Trinity and immanent
Trinity
As unitarian formulations of God became increasingly remote from
its confessional base, a further seperation occurred: the seperation of
the concept of the immanent Trinity from the concept of the
economic Trinity. This, as LaCugna describes it, is a seperation of
theologia (God in Godself) from oikonomia (God For Us). The
seperation, she argues, results in a deductive or descending order in
the normal procedure for theology: first, God in Godself and then,
God for Us.33 Such a deduction compounds the difficulties of
trinitarian intelligibility by reversing the order in which knowledge
(revelation) of the trinitarian God is to be acquired.34
LaCugna has been particularly strident in her condemnation of this
seperation, which she claims was reinforced in the Latin West by
Augustine’s pursuit of a ‘psychological’ analogy for intra-trinitarian
relations: ‘trinitarian doctrine thereafter would be concerned with
relations “internal” to the godhead, disjoined from what we know of
God through Christ in the Spirit’.35 Robert Jenson notes also that, if
propositions about the immanent Trinity become detached from the
biblical triune narrative, then Christians are left with ‘formulas
without meaning’.36 The biblical link is crucial as the foundation of
Christian conceptualising; otherwise the result, as LaCugna puts it
colourfully, is the unintelligible image of ‘a “heavenly committee” of
persons arranged nonlinearly (as in the triangle) or linearly (as in a
vertical row)’.37 LaCugna notes, by contrast, that ‘we less frequently
connect the idea of “Trinity” with the vision of the author of
                                                           
33 LaCugna, God For Us, 43-44.
34 See Carl Braaten (ed) Our Naming of God: Problems and Prospects of God-talk
Today  (Minneapolis, 1989) 16.
35 LaCugna, God For Us, 44.
36 Robert W Jenson, Systematic Theology, Vol 1, The Triune God (New York and
Oxford, 1997) 113.
37 LaCugna, ‘Practical Trinity’, 680.
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Ephesians: God’s open and dynamic life of giving and receiving in
which humanity graciously has been included as partner’.38
Karl Rahner’s renowned axiom provides a definitive response to this
seperation: ‘The “economic” Trinity is the “immanent” Trinity and
the “immanent” Trinity is the “economic” Trinity’ [Die ökonomische
Trinität ist die immanente Trinität und umgekehrt].39 The challenge
for trinitarian thought presented by its history of seperation is posed
by Johnson: it must overcome the notion that in the study of the
Christian God four elements must be considered, ‘namely, one divine
nature plus three divine persons’.40 This is the challenge facing those
concerned to make Christian trinitarian language intelligible and
relevant today.
Facing the Problem of Trinitarian Intelligibility
For trinitarianism to remain intelligible, shifts in systems of thought
and modes of expression must keep pace with linguistic and cultural
change. Recent trinitarian writing confronts past philosophical
systems by at once returning to scriptural witness and engaging with
postmodern thought, thereby moving towards better doctrinal
integration, on the one hand, and better intelligibility in contemporary
terms, on the other. Cunningham notes in this regard the ‘collective
enthusiasm’ among contemporary trinitarian theologians for the
category of ‘relationality’, which is seen to provide an alternative to
the traditional metaphysics of substance.41 The focus of discontent
with the latter lies in its tendency to obscure both God’s internal
relationality and God’s relationality with the world.42 Johnson
explains: ‘Classical thought classifies relation in the category of
accident, thereby rendering it unsuitable for predication about divine
nature [in which nothing inheres] ... Such a non-relational God invites
                                                           
38 Ibid, 680-81.
39 Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans Joseph Donceel (New York, 1970) 22. Mysterium
Salutis, Grundriss heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik, ed Johannes Feiner and Magnus
Löhrer, Vol 2; Die Heilsgeschichte vor Christus, Chapter 5 (Einsiedeln, 1967) 328.
40 Johnson, She Who Is, 224.
41 Cunningham, op cit, 25.
42 Ibid.
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widespread repugnance today’.43 The collective enthusiasm for
relationality represents a reaction to the domination of Western
trinitarian theology by an original metaphysical concept of the ‘single
divine substance’, a concept that has been translated first into the
‘absolute subject’ of German idealism and, later, into the ‘individual’
of the modern thought.
Colin Gunton emphasises that the classical doctrine of the Trinity is
not ‘to be understood as a “model”, developed in its entirety in the
past, which may now be obsolete because the precise form of words
in which it was formulated no longer satisfies modern rational
criteria or theological developments’.44 It is rather a developing
formulation.45 An important part of the process of intellectual
development involves remembering that trinitarian language only
indirectly refers to God. The assumption of literal language is the
enemy of intelligibility.
Cunningham has called for a new phase of trinitarian writing, which
is to have three goals: recontextualising trinitarian thinking in the
present; making it intelligible to Christian and non-Christian alike;
and testifying to its significance for the Christian life.46
Cunningham’s approach reflects Gunton’s in that both maintain that
‘there is not a “model” known as trinitarian doctrine, a fixed set of
formularies, but rather a process of intellectual development – a
tradition – during the course of which a number of conceptual
possibilities have been shaped’.47 Their approach offers the scope for
reinterpretation and redefinition of trinitarian concepts in the search
for contemporary intelligibility.
                                                           
43 Johnson, She Who Is, 224-25. See also William Norris Clarke, ‘Theism and
Process Thought’, New Catholic Encyclopaedia, 1967-1974 Supplement, 648 and
Jennifer Herrick, Does God Change? (Parkland, 2003) 70.
44 Colin Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh, 1997) 194;
emphasis in original.
45 Ibid, 195.
46 Cunningham, op cit, ix.
47 Gunton, op cit, 195.
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A Meeting of Systems of Thought: the Concept of Person
If trinitarian doctrine is a developing intellectual tradition, then the
concept of relationality offers the possibility of increasing its
intelligibility. Applied to the notion of person, it has the potential to
turn around the demise of trinitarian thought. Many academic
theologians have recently sought to make traditional language used
about the Christian trinitarian God intelligible by replacing static
definitions of ‘person’ with a dynamic relational model.
This possibility has emerged from the encounter between classical
and postmodern philosophical, sociological and anthropological
systems of thought. A relational model of person is founded in
biblical tradition and was developed by early Christian authorities,
especially the Greek Cappadocians and later, John Damascene. Early
foundations became obscured, however, in the Western Latin
tradition, due in part to the dominance of Augustine’s ‘psychological
analogy’. It has long been observed that two different forms of
analogy have been used for the Trinity: that of the individual person
and that of community.48 Moltmann observes that ‘ever since
Augustine’s development of the psychological doctrine of the Trinity
the first has taken precedence in the West; whereas the Cappadocian
Fathers and Orthodox theologians, down to the present day, employ
the second category. They incline towards an emphatically social
doctrine of the Trinity’.49 Neil Ormerod finds fault not with the
psychological analogy, but with the inability of modernity and
postmodernity to appropriate it.50
In Orthodox Christianity, the Trinity of persons ‘is not the product of
the absolute Spirit developing outward or the internal differentiation
of an ever-equal divine nature’.51 The fundamental challenge of
                                                           
48 See W. R. Matthews, God In Christian Thought and Experiences (London, 1930),
193.
49 Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 198-99.
50 See Neil Ormerod, ‘The Psychological Analogy for the Trinity: At Odds with
Modernity’, Pacifica 14, 2001, 288-90.
51 Leonardo Boff, Holy Trinity, Perfect Community, trans Phillip Berryman
(Maryknoll, 2000) 58.
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trinitarian faith becomes: ‘How do we equate three with one and one
with three? How reach the unity of a single God from the Trinity of
Persons? And how move from the unity of a single God to the Trinity
of Persons?’.52 With the complexity of these questions and the need
to avoid the heresies of tritheism, subordinationism and modalism,53
it has become a necessary and fundamental task to reconsider the
concept of person.
Theological History and Significance of the Concept of Person
Historically, says Moltmann, ‘trinitarian theology grew up through
the theological remoulding of philosophical terms. This can be seen
very well from the history of the concept “person”’.54 ‘Person’ is a
specifically Christian concept, as Pannenberg notes,55 developed
during the formulation of christological and trinitarian theology in the
first five centuries of the Christian era.  For Zizioulas, ‘the concept of
the person with its absolute and ontological content was born
historically from the endeavour of the Church to give ontological
expression to its faith in the Triune God’.56 The theological
significance of this history of the concept of person, says Zizioulas,
‘includes a philosophical landmark, a revolution in Greek philosophy
… A mode of expression ... which would give an ontological content
to each person of the Holy Trinity, without endangering its biblical
principles ... From this endeavour came the identification of
hypostasis with person’.57
                                                           
52 Ibid, 112.
53 These are three erroneous ways of conceiving the persons of the Trinity: in
tritheism it is said that each of the persons is a God; in subordinationism only the
person of the Father is considered to be the true God; in modalism it is considered
there is only one God and each of the persons are modes of that God’s manifestation
in the world.
54 Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 148.
55 See Wolfhart Pannenberg, ‘Person’, Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart:
Handworterbuch für Theolgie und Religionswissenschaft, cited in Coffey, Deus
Trinitas, 67.
56 Jean Zizioulas, Being As Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church
(Crestwood, 1993) 36.
57 Ibid, 36-7.
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In fitting the concept of person into the new Christian context, the
Council of Chalcedon of 451 CE came to use two complementary
terms – hypostasis, ‘subsistence’, and prosopon, expressing the
spiritual dimension – to arrive at a notion of person as an individual,
concrete, spiritual, subsistent being or spiritual supposition.58 This
theological reflection culminated in the sixth century definition of
Boethius: rationalis naturae individua substantia, ‘individual
substance of a rational nature’.59 This definition is central to the
legacy of trinitarian thought in the West. Fifteen hundred years on,
the critique of the development of this legacy has come to be a most
important task for theologians facing the loss of trinitarian
intelligibility.
Johnson has noted that the intrinsic difficulty of understanding the
meaning of ‘person’ is the semantic drift of this term. Since the
Enlightenment, ‘the arcane philosophical meaning of person has
receded in favour of an understanding of person as an individual
centre of consciousness and freedom’.60 Pannenberg has likewise
observed that modernity involved a change from a metaphysical
understanding to a psychological understanding.61 Pannenberg points
out that ‘the conception of person as spiritual individuality continued
to apply right into modern times, particularly in humanism and the
Enlightenment. The latter saw the kernel of spiritual individuality in
self-consciousness’.62 But there are dangers in pursuing the modern
psychological definition of person over the ontological language of
antiquity. LaCugna points out the irony of the choice: one could
retain the ecclesiastical definition of ‘person’ and risk the doctrine of
the Trinity becoming unintelligible, or incorporate psychological
                                                           
58 Coffey, op cit, 67.
59 Ibid.
60 Johnson, She Who Is, 203.
61 Coffey, op cit, 68.
62 Wolfhart Pannenberg, ‘Person’, col 231, cited in Coffey, op cit, 68: ‘Die
Auffassung der Person als geistige Individualität blieb bis in die Neuzeit hinein
wirksam, besonders in Humanismus und Aufklärung. Letztere sah den Kern der
geistigen Individualität im Selbstbewußtsein’.
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content into personhood and risk the doctrine of the Trinity lapsing
into tritheism.63
Tritheistic and Modalistic Concerns
This new concept of person made the idea of three persons in one
nature impossible.64 This was because, as Boff observes, it led
automatically in a tritheistic direction: when we say that the Father,
the Son and the Holy Spirit are three divine persons, most people
understand the word ‘person’ to mean an individual who has
intelligence, will and feelings, who can say ‘I’.65 Johnson likewise
observes that to say that God is three persons inevitably gives rise to
a picture of God as three distinct people with seperated
consciousnesses.66 The difficulties of this psychological
reinterpretation have been summed up by Coffey by pointing to the
diverse connotations of the single word ‘subject’.67 For Moltmann,
too, ‘ever since Hegel, in particular, the Christian Trinity has tended
to be represented in terms belonging to the general concept of the
absolute subject’.68 He notes that ‘the one, identical, divine, subject
can only be thought of as perfect subject if it can relate to itself. If it
relates to itself this must be viewed as an eternal process of self-
differentiation and self-identification of the absolute subject’.69 The
difficulty here is that ‘the modern concept of God as absolute subject
must renounce the trinitarian concept of person, because the concept
of person also contains the concept of the subject of acts and
relationships. It must ... choose for the trinitarian Persons another,
non-subjective expression’.70
Karl Barth and Rahner therefore chose alternative terminology for the
concept of person applied in trinitarian terms. Barth proposed
                                                           
63 LaCugna, God For Us, 251.
64 Kasper, op cit, 285.
65 Boff, Holy Trinity, 51.
66 Johnson, She Who Is, 203.
67 Coffey, op cit, 68.
68 Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 17.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid, 18.
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speaking of ‘three manners of being’ [drei ‘Seinsweisen’] and
Rahner, ‘three distinct manners of subsisting’ [drei ‘distinkten
Subsistenzweisen’].71 Despite the enormity of their influence, many
theologians have come to regard these two approaches as
inadequate:72 ‘If the concept of person is open to misunderstanding,
the concept of “distinct manner of subsistence” is unintelligible’,
writes Kasper.73 Not only this but ‘no-one can invoke, adore and
glorify a distinct manner of subsisting’.74 Boff repeats the critique,
stressing the abstraction of the formulation and noting the risk of
modalism in these formulations.75 Rahner was aware of the need to
avoid modalistic misunderstanding, saying plainly, ‘God is the
concrete God in each one of these manners of given-ness – which, of
course, refer to each other relatively, “without modalistically
coinciding”’.76 The difficulty may lie in the conceptual starting point
of their analyses: LaCugna laments that Barth and Rahner were torn
between Cartesian individualism and classical definitions, without
being able to move beyond either.77
Between tritheism and modalism lies a gulf; many conclude, with
Kasper, that there is ‘no choice but to retain the traditional language
of the church and interpret it’.78 In order to interpret it, many have
chosen to retain but redefine the concept of person in relational terms.
Barth and Rahner failed to recognise this development in the concept
of person: the movement away from the notion of the self-conscious
subject and towards that of the ‘being-in-relation’. Moltmann
comments on Rahner’s failure to countenance such a notion: ‘What
he describes is actually extreme individualism: … But the
philosophical personalism of Hölderlin, Feuerbach, Buber, Ebner,
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Rosenstock and others was designed precisely to overcome this
possessive individualism: the “I” can only be understood in the light
of the “Thou”’.79 With this development, Boff has confirmed that the
crucial notion of person, essential in trinitarian doctrine, has now
accreted meanings that were previously unthinkable.80 For, as
Johnson declares, ‘personalist and postmodern philosophy insists on
the qualification that the autonomous person is relational through and
through’.81 ‘What is slowly coming to light is a new construal of the
notion of the person, neither a self-encapsulated ego nor a diffuse self
denied, but selfhood on the model of relational autonomy’.82
Cunningham has declared that personhood cannot be divorced from
relation, a claim he finds to be ‘substantiated in a wide variety of
humanistic disciplines, from sociology and psychology to history and
literature’.83 LaCugna also offers a sweeping array of supportive
historical developments to reinforce Moltmann’s point:
In reaction to the atomism and solipsism of critical philosophy, new
currents of thought had arisen in science, philosophy, and psychology that
emphasised the social and relational character of personhood and indeed of
all reality. Already in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Feuerbach,
Fichte and Hegel had argued that persons exist only in relation. In the
twentieth century, as different from each other as Whitehead’s process
philosophy, Sartrean existentialism, French phenomenology,
Wittgenstein’s language analysis and personalist philosophies might be, all
of these postcritical movements sought to go beyond the dualism and
individualism of the Cartesian tradition by giving priority to interaction and
participation as modes of being and knowing. The ‘self’ who exists in the
world as embodied is fundamentally relational. The personalist
philosophies of Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, Felix Ebner and others
would have been a distinct alternative to Descartes, Locke, and company.84
Recognising and appropriating theologically this development in the
concept of person has profound implications for trinitarian thought.
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Reconceiving Person Relationally: Trinitarian Appropriations of
the Concept of Person
New non-theological philosophical and linguistic developments have
brought new categories to bear on the concept of person.
Individuality and relationality have come to be seen as
complementary in understanding of this concept: ‘We can cut a path
through many of the difficulties that beset the question by observing
that all attempts to come to terms with it try to integrate two
fundamental and apparently opposed concepts, individual and
relation’, says Coffey.85 Coffey draws from Fichte who makes the
important point that at the psychological level, individuality (or self-
consciousness) and relation (or spiritually experienced interpersonal
relation) are themselves intrinsically related and condition each other.
Coffey asks whether, if this is so at the psychological level, is it not
likely also to be so at the ontological level?86 Gunton similarly
recognises the interrelationship of individuality and relation in the
concept of person. ‘A person is different from an individual: the latter
is defined in terms of seperation from other individuals; the person, in
terms of relations with other persons’.87
The tension between ‘individuality’ and ‘relation’ informs a range of
postmodern interpretations of person and, as Cunningham notes,
‘theologians differ widely on the terminology that should be used’ in
speaking of the relation between them.88 A couple of examples will
suffice. For Boff, ‘Person is indeed a being-in-oneself and hence
means irreducible individuality, but this individuality is characterised
by the fact of being always open to others. Person is thus a node of
relationships facing all directions. Person is a being of
relationships’.89 Cunningham, on the other hand, has suggested that
the problem of trinitarian thought has its origin in the naming of the
three persons, which tends to individualise them.90 For Cunningham,
                                                           
85 Coffey, op cit, 66.
86 Ibid, 69.
87 Gunton, op cit, 11.
88 Cunningham, op cit, 27.
89 Boff, Holy Trinity, 49-50.
90 Cunningham, op cit, 50.
Jennifer Anne Herrick
287
the recent move to use categories of mutual and reciprocal relation
has as its natural result the naming of the three persons using not
nouns but verbs, words that denote the three as relations, rather than
as substances or seperate individuals.91 Gunton insists on the other
hand that ‘if there is to be a point in speaking of Father, Son and
Spirit, rather than simply of God, then it is incumbent upon the
theologian to say something of that in which their differences
consist’.92 Moltmann agrees that ‘the concept of God may not do
away with the subjective differences between the persons, because
otherwise it would do away with the history which takes place
between the Father, the Son and the Spirit’.93 Within this range of
views, it remains the case, as Cunningham has declared, that ‘the
subject has been “de-centred”’.94 Whether the subject is seen as the
one God or as each of the three persons, contemporary trinitarian
thought is only intelligible within the context of this decentering
process.
Balancing the Personal God and the Persons of the Trinity
A relational model of person has been able to show, as Moltmann has
made clear, that ‘the trinitarian persons are not to be understood as
three different individuals, who only subsequently enter into
relationship with one another ... But they are not, either, three modes
of being or three repetitions of the One God’.95 The need to
understand the ‘three in one’ is the need to balance the personal God
and the persons of the Trinity. A relational model of person does this
by presenting the divine three persons in terms of communion:
The idea became established that the triune God is a single communion or
fellowship formed by the three divine persons themselves. The unity of the
triune God is no longer seen in the homogeneous divine subject nor in the
identical divine subject, but in the eternal perichoresis of Father, Son and
Spirit. This insight has far-reaching consequences for ... human experiences
of God; for the doctrine of the image of God in human beings and the
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conception of a creation which corresponds to God; for the doctrine of the
unity and the form of the church as the ‘icon of the Trinity’; and not least
for the eschatological expectation of a new, eternal community of
creation.96
Gunton similarly explains the significance of relationality in terms of
communion. In a revolutionary manner, God is to be understood:
as a communion of three persons – not individuals – in mutually
constitutive relations with one another. Each is only what he is by virtue of
what the three give to and receive from each other; and yet, by virtue of
their mutually constitutive relations each is distinctive and particular. But
… the doctrine of God has important implications for other, indeed all,
aspects of human life and the being of the world.97
LaCugna affirms in her own way this interpretation: for her the
Trinity demonstrates that God is relational and exists as ‘diverse
persons united in a communion of freedom, love, and knowledge’.98
The idea of God as communion is allowed by the combining of
individuality and relationality in the concept of person. Boff states the
point simply: ‘Only persons can be in communion’.99 This
development gives intelligibility to theological language that is
struggling to reconcile ‘three in one’. Such an idea is not entirely
new: Moltmann points to John Damascene’s ‘profound doctrine of
the eternal circumincessio of the trinitarian Persons’ as testimony to
this.100 Moltmann finds that ‘the doctrine of the perichoresis links
together in a brilliant way the threeness and the unity, without
reducing the threeness to the unity, or dissolving the unity in the
threeness’.101 We might ask: why has it taken till now for the West to
return to and utilise this ancient concept? We can answer with
Moltmann that:
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in the Western church’s doctrine of the Trinity the concept of person was
developed with particular emphasis. This had a strongly formative effect on
Western anthropology. If today we understand Person as the unmistakable
and untransferable individual existence, we owe this to the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity. But why was the concept of the perichoresis – the
unity and fellowship of the Persons – not developed with equal emphasis?
... It is a typically Western bias to suppose that social relationships and
society are less ‘primal’ than the person.102
This is a crucial insight in appreciating the state of play of trinitarian
intelligibility in the West at the beginning of the 21st century. The
effort to find intelligible language for the concept of the Trinity is
focused on the overcoming of this bias.
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